Politics and Fiscal Policy
This paper presents a two-party dynamic model of optimal fiscal policy which integrates stabilizing electroral and partisan motives.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of International and European Economic Studies. Parission 76, Athens Greece 10434|
Phone: +30 1 8203250
Fax: +301 8228419
Web page: http://www.aueb.gr/
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