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Historical review of “umbrella supervision” by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

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  • Mark B. Greenlee

Abstract

The article reviews legislative history and supervisory practices related to bank holding companies with a view toward understanding what Congress meant by referring to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as the “umbrella supervisor” in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. The first part of the article looks at the historical development of bank holding company law and regulation, which laid the foundation for the current practice of umbrella supervision. The second part of the article provides answers to questions related to the Board’s current role as umbrella supervisor: What does “umbrella supervision” mean, and is it different from “consolidated supervision”? How does the GLB Act limit the Board's authority and practice and when did the Board obtain all of the legal authority to allow it to practice umbrella supervision?

Suggested Citation

  • Mark B. Greenlee, 2008. "Historical review of “umbrella supervision” by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System," Working Paper 0807, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0807
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    File URL: https://www.clevelandfed.org/~/media/content/newsroom%20and%20events/publications/working%20papers/2008/wp%200807%20historical%20review%20of%20umbrella%20supervision%20by%20the%20board%20of%20governors%20of%20the%20federal%20pdf.pdf?la=en
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    Cited by:

    1. Yoo, Y. Emilie, 2013. "Financial regulation and supervision across business lines in the United States: Financial holding companies post Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act," IMFS Working Paper Series 76, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    2. Demyanyk, Yuliya & Loutskina, Elena, 2016. "Mortgage companies and regulatory arbitrage," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 328-351.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank holding companies ; Bank supervision ; Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ; Banking law;

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