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Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard

Author

Listed:
  • Raphaël Soubeyran

    (INRA-MOISA)

  • Elodie Rouvière

    (INRA-MOISA)

Abstract

This article deals with the issue of entry into an industry where firms share a collective reputation. First, we show that free entry is not socially optimal; there is a need for regulation through the imposition of a minimum quality standard. Second, we argue that a minimum quality standard can induce firms to enter the market. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a minimum quality standard should not always be considered as a barrier to entry.

Suggested Citation

  • Raphaël Soubeyran & Elodie Rouvière, 2008. "Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard," Working Papers 2008.7, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2008.7
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    Cited by:

    1. McQuade, Timothy & Salant, Stephen W. & Winfree, Jason, 2009. "Markets with untraceable goods of unknown quality: a market failure exacerbated by globalization," MPRA Paper 21874, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Benavente, Daniela, 2010. "The Economics of Geographical Indications: GIs modeled as club assets," Miscellaneous Papers 119116, Agecon Search.
    3. Stefano Castriota & Marco Delmastro, 2011. "Inside the black box of collective reputation," Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia, Finanza e Statistica 89/2011, Università di Perugia, Dipartimento Economia.
    4. Stefano Castriota & Marco Delmastro, 2010. "Individual and Collective Reputation: Lessons from the Wine Market," L'industria, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 149-172.
    5. Benavente, Daniela, 2010. "Geographical Indications: The Economics of Claw-Back," Miscellaneous Papers 119117, Agecon Search.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collective Reputation; Entry; Minimum Quality Standard;

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy

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