The WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin: Implications for South Asia
From neutral trade policy devices employed to identity country of origin of commodities, the rules of origin are emerging as protectionist tools. Nation-states, as they are increasingly denied of conventional trade policy tools, are reasserting themselves by evolving new and less visible weapons of intervention. The misuse of rules of origin as protectionist tools is widely reported from PTAs among developed countries, such as EEC and NAFTA. More recently, non-preferential rules of origin are also being used for protectionist purpose. [Working Paper No. 353]
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