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Fees, Fees and More Fees: How Private Equity Abuses Its Limited Partners and U.S. Taxpayers

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  • Eileen Appelbaum
  • Rosemary Batt

Abstract

The private equity industry receives billions of dollars in income each year from a variety of fees that it collects from investors as well as from companies it buys with investors’ money. This fee income has come under increased scrutiny from investigative journalists, institutional investors in these funds, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the tax-paying public. Since 2012, private equity firms have been audited by the SEC; as a result, several abusive and possibly fraudulent practices have come to light. This report provides an overview of these abuses — the many ways in which some private equity (PE) firms and their general partners gain at the expense of their investors and tax-payers. Private equity general partners (GPs) have misallocated PE firm expenses and inappropriately charged them to investors; have failed to share income from portfolio company monitoring fees with their investors, as stipulated; have waived their fiduciary responsibility to pension funds and other LPs; have manipulated the value of companies in their fund’s portfolio; and have collected transaction fees from portfolio companies without registering as broker-dealers as required by law. In some cases, these activities violate the specific terms and conditions of the Limited Partnership Agreements (LPAs) between GPs and their limited partner investors (LPs), while in others vague and misleading wording allows PE firms to take advantage of their asymmetric position of power vis-à-vis investors and the lack of transparency in their activities. In addition, some of these practices violate the U.S. tax code. Monitoring fees are a tax deductible expense for the portfolio companies owned by PE funds and greatly reduce the taxes these companies pay. In many cases, however, no monitoring services are actually provided and the payments are actually dividends, which are taxable, that are paid to the private equity firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Eileen Appelbaum & Rosemary Batt, 2016. "Fees, Fees and More Fees: How Private Equity Abuses Its Limited Partners and U.S. Taxpayers," CEPR Reports and Issue Briefs 2016-06, Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR).
  • Handle: RePEc:epo:papers:2016-06
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Phalippou, Ludovic & Rauch, Christian & Umber, Marc, 2018. "Private equity portfolio company fees," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(3), pages 559-585.
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    Cited by:

    1. Elena Yu. Makushina, 2022. "Disclosure by Venture Capital Funds Formed Under Investment Partnership Agreement," Finansovyj žhurnal — Financial Journal, Financial Research Institute, Moscow 125375, Russia, issue 2, pages 113-129, April.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G - Financial Economics
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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