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La loi LRU a-t-elle modifié les distributions de pouvoir au sein des universités françaises ?

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Listed:
  • BARTHELEMY Fabrice
  • BERAUD Alain
  • MARTIN Mathieu

    () (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise
    THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise
    THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)

Abstract

La loi LRU (loi relative aux libertés et responsabilités des universités) change la structure du pouvoir au sein des universités françaises. Seuls les membres du conseil d'administration (CA) prennent part à l'election du president, alors qu'auparavant, les membres du conseil scientifique (CS) et du conseil des etudes et de la vie universitaire (CEVU) prenaient part au vote. Notre question est alors de savoir si ce changement radical, le nombre de votants est desormais compris entre 20 et 30, alors qu'il etait compris entre 70 et 140, presente souvent comme une reforme majeure du systeme universitaire, a engendre une repartition differente du pouvoir parmi les groupes representatifs tels que les enseignants, les etudiants, les personnels IATOS et les membres exterieurs.

Suggested Citation

  • BARTHELEMY Fabrice & BERAUD Alain & MARTIN Mathieu, 2009. "La loi LRU a-t-elle modifié les distributions de pouvoir au sein des universités françaises ?," THEMA Working Papers 2009-15, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2009-15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Indice de Banzhaf; pouvoir; universites francaises; loi LRU;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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