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Anatomía de una crisis eléctrica

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  • Carlos Díaz
  • Alexander Galetovic
  • Raimundo Soto

Abstract

Este trabajo estudia formalmente si la ley eléctrica contenía precios suficientes para administrar sin cortes y eficientemente caídas drásticas de la cantidad ofrecida de energía y daba los incentivos correctos para invertir en capacidad de reserva. También analizamos en detalle las consecuencias de limitar las compensaciones a usuarios regulados. Concluimos que el sistema de precios vigente en Chile es intrínsecamente rígido para acomodar grandes shocks de oferta o demanda porque el costo de falla no es un precio contingente. No es razonable suponer que el regulador pueda replicar ex ante los precios que arrojaría un mercado contingente porque los requerimientos de información para hacerlo son formidables. Adicionalmente, obtenemos los siguientes resultados: (a) en años secos el precio de la energía debe ser mayor que los costos de operación y capital de las centrales térmicas de reserva; (b) la ley entregaba incentivos que hubieran moderado las consecuencias de la restricción de oferta, los que fueron anulados por la limitación de las compensaciones a usuarios regulados (art. 99 bis); (c) los errores de cálculo del precio de nudo cometidos por ignorar sequías extremas no afectan a los generadores hidráulicos sino a quienes vendan a precio de nudo independientemente de su mix hidráulico-térmico; (d) limitar las compensaciones a usuarios regulados en condiciones de sequía extrema era innecesario e inefectivo para cautelar el equilibrio financiero de las empresas; (e) la limitación de las compensaciones desarmó el sistema de precios sin beneficios de eficiencia económica; (f) si se limitan las compensaciones a usuarios regulados es eficiente que las transacciones entre generadores se valoricen a costo de falla, medido éste como la valoración promedio de los usuarios regulados racionados.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Díaz & Alexander Galetovic & Raimundo Soto, 1999. "Anatomía de una crisis eléctrica," Documentos de Trabajo 64, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  • Handle: RePEc:edj:ceauch:64
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    2. Serra, Pablo J., 1997. "Energy pricing under uncertain supply," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 209-223, May.
    3. Bernstein, Sebastian & Agurto, Renato, 1992. "Use of outage cost for electricity pricing in Chile," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 299-302, October.
    4. Gabriel Fierro & Pablo Serra, 1993. "Un Modelo de Estimación del Costo de Falla: el Caso de Chile," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 30(90), pages 247-260.
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    Cited by:

    1. Claudio Agostini & Cecilia Plottier & Eduardo Saavedra, 2009. "La Demanda Residencial por Energía Eléctrica en Chile," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv240, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
    2. Carlos Díaz & Alexander Galetovic & Raimundo Soto, "undated". "La crisis eléctrica de 1998-1999: causas, consecuencias y lecciones," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv126, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
    3. Alexander Galetovic & Juan Carlos Olmedo & Humberto Soto, 2002. "Una estimación del costo social de eliminar los déficit de abastecimiento eléctrico en el SIC," Documentos de Trabajo 129, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    4. Alexander Galetovic & Juan Ricardo Inostroza & Cristián Marcelo Muñoz, 2004. "Gas y Electricidad: ¿qué hacer ahora? (Gas and electricity: What should we do now?)," Documentos de Trabajo 198, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    5. Claudio Agostini & M. Cecilia Plottier & Eduardo Saavedra, 2012. "Residential Demand for Electric Energy in Chile," Journal Economía Chilena (The Chilean Economy), Central Bank of Chile, vol. 15(3), pages 64-83, December.
    6. Juan Pablo Montero & Hugh Rudnick, 2001. "Precios Eléctricos Flexibles," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 38(113), pages 91-109.
    7. Carlos Diaz & Raimundo Soto, "undated". "Open-Access Issues in the Chilean Telecommunications and Electricity Sectors," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv124, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.

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