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The Compelling Case for Stronger and More Effective Leverage Regulation in Banking

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  • Admati, Anat R.

    (Stanford University)

Abstract

Excessive leverage (indebtedness) in banking endangers the public and distorts the economy. Yet current and proposed regulations only tweak previous regulations that failed to provide financial stability. This paper discusses the forces that have led to this situation, some of which appear to be misunderstood. The benefits to society of requiring that financial institutions use significantly more equity funding than the status quo are large, while any costs are entirely private and due to banks' ability to shift some of their costs to others when they use debt. Without quantitative analysis, I outline improved regulations and how they can be implemented.

Suggested Citation

  • Admati, Anat R., 2014. "The Compelling Case for Stronger and More Effective Leverage Regulation in Banking," Research Papers 3030, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:3030
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    Cited by:

    1. Marc Sanchez-Roger & María Dolores Oliver-Alfonso & Carlos Sanchís-Pedregosa, 2018. "Bail-In: A Sustainable Mechanism for Rescuing Banks," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(10), pages 1-18, October.
    2. Louhichi, Awatef & Louati, Salma & Boujelbene, Younes, 2020. "The regulations–risk taking nexus under competitive pressure: What about the Islamic banking system?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    3. Joseph Haslag, 2019. "On Processing Central Bank Communications: Can We Account for Fed Watching?," 2019 Meeting Papers 415, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, 2014. "Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(S2), pages 1-34.
    5. Repullo, Rafael & Martinez-Miera, David, 2018. "Markets, Banks, and Shadow Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 13248, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Michael B. Imerman, 2020. "When enough is not enough: bank capital and the Too-Big-To-Fail subsidy," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 55(4), pages 1371-1406, November.
    7. Michael B. Imerman, 0. "When enough is not enough: bank capital and the Too-Big-To-Fail subsidy," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-36.
    8. Partha Mohanram & Sasan Saiy & Dushyantkumar Vyas, 2018. "Fundamental analysis of banks: the use of financial statement information to screen winners from losers," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 200-233, March.
    9. Koresh Galil & Margalit Samuel & Offer Moshe Shapir & Wolf Wagner, 2023. "Bailouts and the modeling of bank distress," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 7-30, February.
    10. Temimi, Akram & Zeitun, Rami & Mimouni, Karim, 2016. "How does the tax status of a country impact capital structure? Evidence from the GCC region," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 37, pages 71-89.
    11. Shabir, Mohsin & Jiang, Ping & Bakhsh, Satar & Zhao, Zhongxiu, 2021. "Economic policy uncertainty and bank stability: Threshold effect of institutional quality and competition," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    12. Pavel Kapinos & Oscar A. Mitnik, 2016. "A Top-down Approach to Stress-testing Banks," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 229-264, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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