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Why Do People Give? The Role of Identity in Giving

Author

Listed:
  • Aaker, Jennifer L.

    (Stanford University)

  • Akutsu, Satoshi

    (Hitotsubashi University)

Abstract

Why do people give to others? One principal driver involves one's identity: who one is and how they view themselves. The degree to which identities are malleable, involve a readiness to act, and help make sense of the world have significant implications determining whether and how much people give. Drawing on the Identity-Based Motivation model (IBM; Oyserman, 2009), we provide a tripartite framework to help advance the research on the psychology of giving.

Suggested Citation

  • Aaker, Jennifer L. & Akutsu, Satoshi, 2009. "Why Do People Give? The Role of Identity in Giving," Research Papers 2027, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:2027
    as

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    File URL: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP2027.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Silke Boenigk & Marcel Lee Mayr, 2016. "The Happiness of Giving: Evidence from the German Socioeconomic Panel That Happier People Are More Generous," Journal of Happiness Studies, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 1825-1846, October.
    2. repec:eee:jbrese:v:79:y:2017:i:c:p:173-180 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Shih-Ying Wu, 2014. "Does charitable gambling crowd out charitable donations? Using matching to analyze a policy reform," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 21(6), pages 975-996, December.
    4. Llamas, Rosa & Thomsen, Thyra Uth, 2016. "The luxury of igniting change by giving: Transforming yourself while transforming others' lives," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 166-176.
    5. repec:spr:amsrev:v:2:y:2012:i:2:d:10.1007_s13162-012-0028-3 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Tang, Linyao, 2010. "放任与管制的或此或彼:俄罗斯市场转型录
      [Totalitarianism and Laissez-faire: A meditation on Russian Market]
      ," MPRA Paper 26201, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Jul 2010.

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