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Macro Politics and Micro Models: Cartels and Pivots Reconsidered

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  • Krehbiel, Keith

    (Stanford U)

Abstract

A framework is introduced for evaluating static micro-analytic theories in dynamic macro-political settings. Within the framework, two theories of lawmaking are compared. Analytically, the predictions of the theories are remarkably similar- almost to the point of being observationally equivalent. However, analysis focusing on critical, theory-specific regime changes provides an opportunity for some discrimation. The findings provide some support for both partisan and nonpartisan theories, the relative strength of which seems to depend upon roll calls selected for analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Krehbiel, Keith, 2003. "Macro Politics and Micro Models: Cartels and Pivots Reconsidered," Research Papers 1859, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:1859
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    File URL: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP1859.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. McCarty, Nolan & Poole, Keith T. & Rosenthal, Howard, 2001. "The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(3), pages 673-687, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Krehbiel, Keith & Meirowitz, Adam & Woon, Jonathan, 2004. "Testing Theories of Lawmaking," Research Papers 1860, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.

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