Competition and Altruism in Microcredit Markets
We analyze the effects of entry in a previously monopolistic microcredit market characterized by asymmetric information and by institutions that offer only one type of contract. We consider different behavioral assumptions concerning the Incumbent and study their influence on equilibrium predictions. We show that competition leads to contract differentiation but can make borrowers worse off. Moreover, the screening process creates a previously unexplored source of rationing. We show that if the incumbent institution is altruistic, rationing is reduced and that this can positively affect the competitor's profit.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published by:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Av. F.D., Roosevelt, 39, 1050 Bruxelles|
Phone: (32 2) 650 30 75
Fax: (32 2) 650 44 75
Web page: http://difusion.ulb.ac.be
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Craig McIntosh & Alain Janvry & Elisabeth Sadoulet, 2005. "How Rising Competition Among Microfinance Institutions Affects Incumbent Lenders," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 987-1004, October.
- Jonathan Morduch, 1999. "The Microfinance Promise," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1569-1614, December.
- By Paolo Casini, 2015.
"Competitive microcredit markets: differentiation and ex ante incentives for multiple borrowing,"
Oxford Economic Papers,
Oxford University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 1015-1033.
- Paolo Casini, 2010. "Competitive Microcredit Markets: Differentiation and ex-ante Incentives for Multiple Borrowing," LICOS Discussion Papers 26610, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
- Sergio Navajas & Jonathan Conning & Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, 2003.
"Lending technologies, competition and consolidation in the market for microfinance in Bolivia,"
Journal of International Development,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(6), pages 747-770.
- Jonathan Conning & Sergio Navajas & Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, 2003. "Lending Technologies, Competition, and Consolidation in the Market for Microfinance in Bolivia," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 213, Hunter College Department of Economics.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
- Dean S. Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, 2008.
"Credit Elasticities in Less-Developed Economies: Implications for Microfinance,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 1040-68, June.
- Karlan, Dean S. & Zinman, Jonathan, 2007. "Credit Elasticities in Less-Developed Economies: Implications for Microfinance," CEPR Discussion Papers 6071, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hoff, Karla & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1998.
"Moneylenders and bankers: price-increasing subsidies in a monopolistically competitive market,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 485-518, April.
- Hoff, Karla & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1997. "Moneylenders and bankers: price-increasing subsidies in a monopolistically competitive market," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 429-462, April.
- McIntosh, Craig & Wydick, Bruce, 2005. "Competition and microfinance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 271-298, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2008_037. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Benoit Pauwels)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.