Ouverture et développement: considérations d'économie politique
In this paper, we present a model in which education increases productivity and political participation of citizen. A capitalist Oligarchy is supposed to be in power initially in a developing economy in which the majority of workers are uneducated. When the economy is closed to international capital flows, the capitalist Elite may have an incentive to subsidize the education of the poor and eventually to accept a change in the balance of power when the workers' education .increases the profitability of capital in the economy. Under international financial integration, on the other hand , this incentive vanishes completely The paper investigates in such a context the costs and benefits of openness for the various agents and society as a whole.
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|Date of creation:||2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Revue Economique, 2001|
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