Ouverture et développement. Considérations d'économie politique
This paper presents a model in which education affects simultaneously individual productivity and political participation. A capitalist oligarchy initially holds political power in a developing economy where the majority of workers are uneducated. When the economy is closed, it can be in the interest of the capitalist Elite to subsidize the education of the workers in order to increase the domestic return on capital. This incentive however disappears when the economy becomes open to foreign capital flows. The paper investigates the costs and benefits of openness from the point of view of the various agents and the national economy as a whole. Classification JEL : O11, O15, D72.
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