A Refined Bargaining Set of an n-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation
The two most fundamental questions in cooperative game theory are: When a game is played, what coalitions will be formed and what payoff vectors will be chosen? No previous solution concepts or theories in the literature provide satisfactory answers to both questions; answers are especially lacking for the first one. In this paper we introduce the refined bargaining set, which is the first solution concept in cooperative game theory that simultaneously provides answers to both of the fundamental questions.
|Date of creation:||Apr 1991|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Games and Economic Behavior (1994), 6: 512-526|
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- Volker Boehm, 1974. "The Core of an Economy with Production," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(3), pages 429-436.
- Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
- Vohra, Rajiv, 1991. "An existence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 19-34.
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