IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cte/wbrepe/wb071105.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A reasonable benchmarking frontier using DEA : an incentive scheme to improve efficiency in public hospitals

Author

Listed:
  • Prior, Diego
  • Surroca, Jordi

Abstract

There exists research relating management concepts with productivity measurement methods that offers useful solutions for improving management control in the public sector. Within this sphere, we connect agency theory with efficiency analysis and describe how to define an incentives scheme that can be applied in the public sector to monitor the efficiency and productivity of managers. To fulfill the main objective of this research, we propose an iterative process for determining what we define as a ‘reasonable frontier’, a concept that provides the foundation required to establish the incentive scheme for the managers. Our ‘reasonable frontier’ has the following properties: i) it detects the presence of outliers, ii) it proposes a procedure to establish the influence introduced by extreme observations, and iii) it sorts out the problem of data masking. The proposed method is applied to a sample of hospitals taken from the public network of the Spanish health service. The results obtained confirm the applicability of the proposal made. Summing up, we define and apply a useful method, combining aspects of agency theory and efficiency analysis, which is of interest to those public authorities trying to design effective incentive schemes which influence the decision making of the public managers.

Suggested Citation

  • Prior, Diego & Surroca, Jordi, 2007. "A reasonable benchmarking frontier using DEA : an incentive scheme to improve efficiency in public hospitals," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB wb071105, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
  • Handle: RePEc:cte:wbrepe:wb071105
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/handle/10016/647/wb071105.pdf?sequence=1
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incentives;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cte:wbrepe:wb071105. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ana Poveda). General contact details of provider: http://www.business.uc3m.es/es/index .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.