Managerial Husbandry and the Dynamics of Ongoing Firms
This paper studies the supply and demand for on-the- job training when the success of training is stochastic, firms have to pay hiring costs when they hire skilled workers from the outside, and firms have strictly concave production functions. There are predictions about firm level dynamics and interactions between labor mobility and firm performance. The model generates intermittent labor market events such as lateral mobility, promotions, layoffs and variation in earnings across identically skilled workers. It also explains two labor market phenomena: up or out rules and fast track jobs.
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|Date of creation:||Sep 1992|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published, European Economic Review, 40(7), pages 1483-1499, August 1996|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: P.O. Box 8888, Downtown Station, Montreal (Canada) Quebec, H3C 3P8|
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