IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/6349.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Corporate Governance and Collusive Behaviour

Author

Listed:
  • Buccirossi, Paolo
  • Spagnolo, Giancarlo

Abstract

This chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance and competition, particularly with regard to cartel formation, and discusses how corporate governance and firm agency problems affect optimal law enforcement against cartels, both in terms of sanctions and leniency policies. Many of the conclusions appear applicable, with minor changes, to non-antitrust forms of collusion, such as collusion between auditors and management, and more generally to corporate and organized crime.

Suggested Citation

  • Buccirossi, Paolo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2007. "Corporate Governance and Collusive Behaviour," CEPR Discussion Papers 6349, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6349
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6349
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Suha Alawi, 2014. "Corporate Governance and Cartel formation," Proceedings of Economics and Finance Conferences 0401246, International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Amnesty; Antitrust; Cartels; CEO compensation; Collusion; Corporate crime; Corporate fraud; Corporate governance; Corporate liability; Corruption; Deterrence; Employee liability; Fines; Immunity; Imprisonment; Indemnification; Judgement proofness; Leniency; Managerial incentives; Optimal sanctions; Rewards; Whistleblowers;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6349. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.