IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/393.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Target Zones and International Policy Coordination: The Contrast Between the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Success

Author

Listed:
  • Hughes Hallett, Andrew

Abstract

This paper distinguishes between some obvious necessary and sufficient conditions for adopting the target zone proposal as a means of improving macroeconomic performance. The necessary conditions may be satisfied fairly easily, but it is a good deal more difficult to design a targeting system that satisfies the sufficient conditions when the exchange rate is used as an intermediate target. On that criterion the gains may be smaller than previously estimated. Target Zones do, however, have important practical advantages. They are effective in promoting stability. They are also a simple but relatively uncontroversial way to secure the coordination necessary to stop policymakers from adopting inefficient or undesirably competitive polici.

Suggested Citation

  • Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 1990. "Target Zones and International Policy Coordination: The Contrast Between the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Success," CEPR Discussion Papers 393, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:393
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=393
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Creel, Jerome & Capoen, Fabrice & Cussy, Pascal & Lenoble-Liaud, Helene, 2003. "How to manage financial shocks: Intra-European vs. international monetary coordination," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 431-455, December.
    2. Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2005. "In Praise of Fiscal Restraint and Debt Rules. What the Euro Zone Might Do Now," CEPR Discussion Papers 5043, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Douven, R. C. & Engwerda, J. C., 1995. "Is there room for convergence in the E.C.?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 113-130, March.
    4. Douven, R. C. & Plasmans, J. E. J., 1996. "SLIM, a small linear interdependent model of eight EU-member states, the USA and Japan," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 185-233, April.
    5. Douven, R.C.M.H. & Engwerda, J.C., 1995. "Properties of N-person axiomatic bargaining solutions if the Pareto frontier is twice differentiable and strictly concave," Other publications TiSEM ef77e675-1d26-4a70-abff-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. A.J. Hallet, 1998. "When Do Target Zones Work? An Examination of Exchange Rate Targeting as a Device for Coordinating Economic Policies," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 115-138, April.
    7. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Richter, Christian, 2004. "Estimating an equilibrium exchange rate for the dollar and other key currencies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 1117-1144, December.
    8. Peter Mooslechner & Martin Schuerz, 1999. "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination: Any Lessons for EMU? A Selective Survey of the Literature," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 171-199, September.
    9. Christodoulakis, Nicos & Garratt, Anthony & Currie, David, 1996. "Target zones and alternative proposals for G3 policy coordination: An empirical evaluation using GEM," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 49-68.
    10. Andrew Hallett & Nicola Viegi, 2002. "Inflation Targeting as a Coordination Device," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 341-362, October.
    11. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Mavrodimitrakis, Christos, 2019. "Cooperation vs. leadership in a core-periphery monetary union: Inter-country vs. inter-institutional policy coordination," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 103-122.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:393. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.