Non-Preferential Trading Clubs
This Paper examines the welfare implications of non-discriminatory tariff reforms by a subset of countries, which we term a non-preferential trading club. We show that there exist coordinated tariff reforms, accompanied by appropriate income transfers between these countries, which unambiguously increase the welfare of these member countries while leaving the welfare of non-members unaltered. These tariff reforms are chosen to maintain world prices at their pre-club levels and, in this respect, the trading clubs act in a Kemp-Wan-like manner. In terms of economic policy implications, our results show that there exist regional, MFN-consistent arrangements that lead to Pareto improvements in world welfare. Open regionalism is an example of such trading arrangements.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2002|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.|
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Srinivasan, T-N, 1996.
"The Common External Tariff of a Customs Union : Alternative Approaches,"
755, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
- Srinivasan, T. N., 1997. "The common external tariff of a customs union: Alternative approaches," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 447-465, December.
- Neary, J Peter, 1997.
"Pitfalls in the Theory of International Trade Policy: Concertina Reforms of Tariffs and Subsidies to HIgh-Technology Industries,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1740, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Neary, J Peter, 1998. " Pitfalls in the Theory of International Trade Policy: Concertina Reforms of Tariffs, and Subsidies to High-Technology Industries," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(1), pages 187-206, March.
- J. Peter Neary, 1997. "Pitfalls in the theory of international trade policy : concertina reform of tariffs, and subsidies to high-technology industries," Working Papers 199726, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
- J. P. Neary, 1997. "Pitfalls in the theory of international trade policy: concertina reforms of tariffs and subsidies to high technology industries," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20341, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Neary, J. P., 1997. "Pitfalls in the Theory of International Trade Policy: Concertina Reforms of Tariffs, and Subsidies to High-Technology Industries," Papers 97/26, College Dublin, Department of Political Economy-.
- J.P. Neary, 1997. "Pitfalls in the Theory of International Trade Policy: Concertina Reforms of Tariffs and Subsidies to High Technology Industries," CEP Discussion Papers dp0346, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Kemp, Murray C. & Wan, Henry Jr., 1976. "An elementary proposition concerning the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 95-97, February.
- C. Fred Bergsten, 1997.
The World Economy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 545-565, 08.
- Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1997.
"An Economic Theory of GATT,"
NBER Working Papers
6049, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- W. E. Diewert & A. H. Turunen-Red & A. D. Woodland, 1989. "Productivity- and Pareto-Improving Changes in Taxes and Tariffs," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 199-215.
- Mark Melatos & Alan D. Woodland, 2007. "Pareto-optimal Delegation in Customs Unions," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 441-461, 08.
- John Kennan & Raymond Riezman, 1990.
"Optimal Tariff Equilibria with Customs Unions,"
Canadian Journal of Economics,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(1), pages 70-83, February.
- Diewert, W. E., 1973. "Functional forms for profit and transformation functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 284-316, June.
- Hatta, Tatsuo & Fukushima, Takashi, 1979. "The welfare effect of tariff rate reductions in a many country world," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 503-511, November.
- Kemp, M.C. & Shimomura, K., 1998.
"A Second Elementary Proposition Concerning the Formation of Customs Unions,"
98/09, New South Wales - School of Economics.
- Murray C. Kemp & Koji Shimomura, 2001. "A Second Elementary Proposition Concerning the Formation of Customs Unions," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 52(1), pages 64-69.
- Murray C. Kemp & Koji Shimomura, 1998. "A Second Elementary Proposition Concerning: The Formation of Customs Unions," Discussion Paper Series 95, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, revised May 1998.
- Richardson, Martin, 1995. "On the Interpretation of the Kemp/Wan Theorem," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 696-703, October.
- Arvind Panagariya, 2000. "Preferential Trade Liberalization: The Traditional Theory and New Developments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(2), pages 287-331, June.
- Panagariya, Arvind & Krishna, Pravin, 2002. "On necessarily welfare-enhancing free trade areas," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 353-367, August.
- Mayer, Wolfgang, 1981. "Theoretical Considerations on Negotiated Tariff Adjustments," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 135-53, March.
- Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 2004. "Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT/WTO," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 1-29, May.
- Anderson, James E & Neary, J Peter, 1992. "Trade Reform with Quotas, Partial Rent Retention, and Tariffs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 57-76, January.
- Sontheimer, Kevin C, 1971. "The Existence of International Trade Equilibrium with Trade Tax-Subsidy Distortions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(6), pages 1015-35, November.
- Turunen-Red, Arja H & Woodland, Alan D, 1991. "Strict Pareto-Improving Multilateral Reforms of Tariffs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1127-52, July.
- Fukushima, Takashi & Kim, Namdoo, 1989. "Welfare improving tariff changes : A case of many goods and countries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3-4), pages 383-388, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3572. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.