International Monetary Cooperation under Tariff Threats
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- Basevi, Giorgio & Denicolo, Vincenzo & Delbono, Flavio, 1990. "International monetary cooperation under tariff threats," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 1-23, February.
- G. Basevi & F. Delbono & V. Denicolo, "undated". "International Monetary Cooperation Under Tariff Threats," Working Papers 40, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Marion Kohler, 1998. "Optimal currency areas and customs unions: are they connected?," Bank of England working papers 89, Bank of England.
- Dudley Cooke, 2016.
"Optimal Monetary Policy with Endogenous Export Participation,"
Review of Economic Dynamics,
Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 21, pages 72-88, July.
- Dudley Cooke, 2015. "Online Appendix to "Optimal Monetary Policy with Endogenous Export Participation"," Technical Appendices 12-204, Review of Economic Dynamics.
- Matteo Cacciatore, 2013. "Trade, Unemployment, and Monetary Policy," 2013 Meeting Papers 724, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Stahl, Dale O. & Turunen-Red, Arja H., 1995. "Tariff games: Cooperation with random variation in political regimes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 215-238, June.
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KeywordsMonetary Policy; Tariffs; Threat And Punishment Strategies;
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