The Unemployment Implications of Mandatory Firing Costs
The model developed in this paper examines the relationship between firing costs and unemployment in a simple two-period model with uncertainty. Where there are long-term employment relationships, and where risk-averse workers and risk-neutral firms bargain over wages and firing costs, average unemployment is unlikely to be affected by statutory firing costs, although firms' profits will decline if the statutory level exceeds the bargained level. In a unionised sector with no bargaining over firing costs, the presence of statutory firing costs reduces employment distortions associated with trade unions. However, where there are no gains to employers to long-term labour relationships, the introduction of mandated firing costs will be associated with a higher incidence of temporary employment contracts and short-term jobs.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
|Date of creation:||Dec 1994|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.|
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1096. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.