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Evading, auditing and taxing

Author

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  • CREMER, Helmuth
  • MARCHAND, Maurice
  • PESTIEAU, Pierre

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • CREMER, Helmuth & MARCHAND, Maurice & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 1990. "Evading, auditing and taxing," LIDAM Reprints CORE 911, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:911
    DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(90)90051-I
    Note: In : The equity-compliance tradeoff. Journal of Public Economics, 43, 67-92, 1990
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Maria-Augusta Miceli, 2020. "VAT Compliance Incentives," Papers 2002.07862, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
    2. Privileggi, Fabio, 2007. "The cutoff policy of taxation when CRRA taxpayers differ in risk aversion coefficients and income: a proof," POLIS Working Papers 99, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
    3. Cécile Bazart & Mickael Beaud & Dimitri Dubois, 2020. "Whistleblowing vs. Random Audit: An Experimental Test of Relative Efficiency," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(1), pages 47-67, February.
    4. Eduardo Zilberman, 2016. "Audits or Distortions: The Optimal Scheme to Enforce Self-Employment Income Taxes," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(4), pages 511-544, August.
    5. Jean-Jacques Laffont, 2003. "Enforcement, Regulation and Development," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 12(Supplemen), pages 193-211, September.
    6. Gresik, Thomas A., 2010. "Formula apportionment vs. separate accounting: A private information perspective," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 133-149, January.
    7. Simon Halphen Boserup & Jori Veng Pinje, 2010. "Tax Evasion, Information Reporting, and the Regressive Bias Hypothesis," EPRU Working Paper Series 2010-13, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    8. Compton, Ryan & Nicholls, Christopher C. & Sandler, Daniel & Tedds, Lindsay, 2011. "Quantifying the Personal Income Tax Benefits of Backdating: A Canada - US Comparison," MPRA Paper 39789, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Kim, Sangheon, 2008. "Does political intention affect tax evasion?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 401-415.
    10. M. Martin Boyer, 2000. "Centralizing Insurance Fraud Investigation*," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 25(2), pages 159-178, December.
    11. Mohamed Salah Matoussi & Wided Mattoussi, 2010. "On the Design of Total Water Use-Based Incentive Schemes for Sustainable Groundwater Management," Working Papers 575, Economic Research Forum, revised 12 Jan 2010.
    12. Inés Macho-Stadler & J. Pérez-Castrillo, 1996. "Optimal tax auditing when some individuals need not file," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 99-115, December.
    13. Kuhn, Michael & Siciliani, Luigi, 2008. "Upcoding and Optimal Auditing in Health Care (or The economics of DRG creep)," CEPR Discussion Papers 6689, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Inés Macho Stadler & David Perez-Castrillo, 2005. "Optimal inspection policy and income-tax compliance," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 173(2), pages 9-45, June.

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