Basing point pricing: Competition versus collusion
The authors consider the implications of game-theoretic models for the competitive or collusive nature of basing point pricing. In one-shot games, equilibrium price schedules do not generally conform to basing point pricing with unrestricted price competition. Nevertheless, basing point pricing can emerge in dynamic contexts. Define modified FOB price policy as using FOB in one's natural market and matching the rival's delivered price whenever profitable. A configuration where both firms do this is a subgame perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game where firms choose first price policies and then compete in the marketplace. Further, with repeated.competition basing point pricing can be used as punishment device. Copyright 1992 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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|Note:||In : The Journal of Industrial Economics, 40(3), 249-260, 1992|
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