IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cor/louvco/1997082.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Export restraints and horizontal product differentiation

Author

Listed:
  • BOCCARD, Nicolas

    (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)

  • WAUTHY, Xavier

    (FNRS and IRES, Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

We consider the effects of export restraints on price competition in the Hotelling model of hor- izontal product differentiation. We characterise the Nash equilibrium for all possible values of the quota and compare our results with those of Krishna [89]. We show that a foreign pro- ducer would choose a Voluntary Export Restraint in the vicinity of the Free Trade Equilibrium. In order to maximise domestic welfare, a government would not necessarily choose complete protectionism nor free trade.

Suggested Citation

  • BOCCARD, Nicolas & WAUTHY, Xavier, 1997. "Export restraints and horizontal product differentiation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1997082, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1997082
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp1997.html
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hernan Vallejo, 2006. "International trade, migration and investment with horizontal product differentiation and free entry and exit of firms," Revista de Economía del Rosario, Universidad del Rosario, November.
    2. Xavier Wauthy, 2002. "A note on Research and Development and Voluntary Export Restrictions"," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 6(1), pages 1-6.
    3. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:6:y:2002:i:1:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hotelling; optimal quota; price competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1997082. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alain GILLIS (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/coreebe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.