Export restraints and horizontal product differentiation
We consider the effects of export restraints on price competition in the Hotelling model of hor- izontal product differentiation. We characterise the Nash equilibrium for all possible values of the quota and compare our results with those of Krishna . We show that a foreign pro- ducer would choose a Voluntary Export Restraint in the vicinity of the Free Trade Equilibrium. In order to maximise domestic welfare, a government would not necessarily choose complete protectionism nor free trade.
|Date of creation:||01 Oct 1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)|
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1997082. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.