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Quién decide qué y por qué Relaciones entre Ejecutivo y Legislativo en materia de Planeación

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  • Margarita María Varón Perea

    ()

Abstract

El objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar que la evolución de la institucionalidad de planeación en Colombia creó unas reglas de juego bajo las cuales el Ejecutivo concentra las decisiones sobre laprogramación del gasto público y que dicha concentración anula la separación de poderes consagrada en la Constitución de 1991.Se aborda la evolución de la institucionalidad de la planeación en Colombia con el fin de resaltar momentos determinantes de la relación entre el Ejecutivo y el Legislativo y se estudia la aproximación de la Corte al principio de la separación de poderes en materia de planeación con base en las sentencias C-557/00 y C-1403/00, con el fin de evidenciar las tensiones que surgen de dos diseños institucionales distintos que se encuentran consagrados en la Constitución Política de1991.

Suggested Citation

  • Margarita María Varón Perea, 2010. "Quién decide qué y por qué Relaciones entre Ejecutivo y Legislativo en materia de Planeación," ARCHIVOS DE ECONOMÍA 006445, DEPARTAMENTO NACIONAL DE PLANEACIÓN.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000118:006445
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    File URL: https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Estudios%20Econmicos/356_Ejecutivo%20y%20legislativo%20frente%20al%20PND.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kugler, Maurice & Rosenthal, Howard, 2000. "Checks and balances: an assessment of the institutional separation of political powers in Colombia," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 18, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    2. Kugler, Maurice & Rosenthal, Howard, 2000. "Checks and balances: an assessment of the institutional separation of political powers in Colombia," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0018, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
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    Keywords

    planeación o planificación; separación de poderes; Congreso y Ejecutivo;

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