Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Random Matched Individuals
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- Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
- Gilboa, Itzhak & Matsui, Akihiko, 1992.
"A model of random matching,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 185-197.
- Boylan, Richard., 1990. "Equilibria Resistant to Mutation," Working Papers 729, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
- Edward J. Green, 1994. "Individual Level Randomness in a Nonatomic Population," GE, Growth, Math methods 9402001, EconWPA.
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