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CEO Incentives and Bank Risk over the Business Cycle

Author

Listed:
  • Steven Ongena

    (University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance; Swiss Finance Institute; KU Leuven; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR))

  • Tanseli Savaser

    (Vassar College - Department of Economics)

  • Elif Sisli Ciamarra

    (Stonehill College)

Abstract

We examine whether the relationship between managerial risk-taking incentives and bank risk is sensitive to the underlying macroeconomic conditions. We find that risk-taking incentives provided to bank executives are associated with higher bank riskiness during economic downturns. We attribute this finding to the increase in moral hazard during macroeconomic downturns when the perceived probability of future bailouts and government guarantees rises. This association is particularly strong for larger banks, banks that maintain lower capital ratios and banks that are managed by more powerful CEOs. Our findings highlight the importance of the interaction between managerial incentives and the macroeconomic environment. Boards and regulators may find it useful to consider the countercyclical nature of the relationship between risk-taking incentives and bank riskiness when designing managerial compensation.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven Ongena & Tanseli Savaser & Elif Sisli Ciamarra, 2020. "CEO Incentives and Bank Risk over the Business Cycle," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 20-75, Swiss Finance Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp2075
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    Cited by:

    1. Durrani, Agha & Metzler, Julian & Michail, Nektarios & Werner, Johannes Gabriel, 2022. "Bank lending rates and the remuneration for risk: evidence from portfolio and loan level data," Working Paper Series 2753, European Central Bank.
    2. Daniel Ofori-Sasu & Emmanuel Sarpong-Kumankoma & Saint Kuttu & Elikplimi Komla Agbloyor & Joshua Yindenaba Abor, 2024. "Risk-taking and systemic banking crisis in Africa: do regulatory policy framework provide new insight in threshold models?," Risk Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 26(2), pages 1-37, May.
    3. Gang Bai & Qiurong Yang & Elyas Elyasiani, 2022. "Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives and Bank Earnings Management: Evidence from FAS 123R," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(21), pages 1-21, October.
    4. Tran, Dung Viet & Hassan, M. Kabir & AlTalafha, Sarah H. & Turunen-Red, Arja, 2021. "Policy uncertainty, the use of derivatives: Evidence from U.S. bank holdingcompanies (BHCs)," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    5. Baolei Qi & Mohamed Marie & Ahmed S. Abdelwahed & Ibrahim N. Khatatbeh & Mohamed Omran & Abdallah A. S. Fayad, 2023. "Bank Risk Literature (1978–2022): A Bibliometric Analysis and Research Front Mapping," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(5), pages 1-27, March.
    6. Gaia Soana, Maria, 2024. "Does ESG contracting align or compete with stakeholder interests?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    7. Gao, Haoyu & Ouyang, Yiling & Wang, Yaxin, 2024. "Corporate bond defaults and spillover effects on bank risk: Evidence from city commercial banks in China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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