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Altruistic Cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • Aurel Stenzel
  • Johannes Lohse
  • Till Requate
  • Israel Waichman

Abstract

We characterize 'Games of Altruistic Cooperation' as a class of games in which cooperation leaves the individual and the group of decision-makers worse off than defection, but favors individuals outside the group. An example is climate change mitigation. In this context, we experimentally investigate whether decentralized institutions using costly punishment and/or communication support altruistic cooperation to sustain the welfare of future generations. Without punishment or communication, cooperation is low; communication alone even increases the incidence of zero contributions. However, combining peer punishment with communication strongly increases cooperation, showing that an effective decentralized solution to a Game of Altruistic Cooperation exists.

Suggested Citation

  • Aurel Stenzel & Johannes Lohse & Till Requate & Israel Waichman, 2025. "Altruistic Cooperation," CESifo Working Paper Series 11880, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11880
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bochet, Olivier & Page, Talbot & Putterman, Louis, 2006. "Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 11-26, May.
    2. Johannes Lohse & Israel Waichman, 2020. "The effects of contemporaneous peer punishment on cooperation with the future," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 11(1), pages 1-8, December.
    3. Bock, Olaf & Baetge, Ingmar & Nicklisch, Andreas, 2014. "hroot: Hamburg Registration and Organization Online Tool," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 117-120.
    4. Oliver P. Hauser & David G. Rand & Alexander Peysakhovich & Martin A. Nowak, 2014. "Cooperating with the future," Nature, Nature, vol. 511(7508), pages 220-223, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    games of altruistic cooperation; social dilemma; intergenerational good game; punishment; communication;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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