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Robustly Optimal Monetary Policy

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  • Kevin D. Sheedy

Abstract

This paper analyses optimal monetary policy in response to shocks using a model that avoids making specific assumptions about the stickiness of prices, and thus the nature of the Phillips curve. Nonetheless, certain robust features of the optimal monetary policy commitment are found. The optimal policy rule is a flexible inflation target which is adhered to in the short run without any accommodation of structural inflation persistence, that is, inflation which it is costly to eliminate. The target is also made more stringent when it has been missed in the past. With discretion on the other hand, the target is loosened to accommodate fully any structural inflation persistence, and any past deviations from the inflation target are ignored. These results apply to a wide range of price stickiness models because the market failure which the policymaker should aim to mitigate arises from imperfect competition, not from price stickiness itself.

Suggested Citation

  • Kevin D. Sheedy, 2007. "Robustly Optimal Monetary Policy," CEP Discussion Papers dp0840, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  • Handle: RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0840
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    Cited by:

    1. Saborowski, Christian, 2010. "Inflation targeting as a means of achieving disinflation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(12), pages 2510-2532, December.
    2. Sheedy, Kevin D., 2010. "Intrinsic inflation persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(8), pages 1049-1061, November.
    3. Woodford, Michael, 2010. "Optimal Monetary Stabilization Policy," Handbook of Monetary Economics,in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 14, pages 723-828 Elsevier.
    4. Simon Wren-Lewis & Fabian Eser, 2009. "When is Monetary Policy All we Need?," Economics Series Working Papers 430, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    5. Woodford, Michael, 2010. "Optimal Monetary Stabilization Policy," Handbook of Monetary Economics,in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 14, pages 723-828 Elsevier.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Inflation persistence; optimal monetary policy; rules versus discretion; stabilization bias; inflation targeting;

    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit

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