Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: the Multi-Agent Case with Transferable Utility
Bester and Strausz (2000) showed that the revelation principle of Bester and Strausz (2001) does not apply in a setting of many agents and no commitment. In their counterexample only one agent has private information. We show that if the parties can make ex ante transfers the revelation principle does extend to this setting. However, we show that it does not extend to a setting in which more than one agent has private information.
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