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Level-K Mechanism Design

Listed author(s):
  • Geoffroy de Clippel
  • Rene Saran
  • Roberto Serrano

Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, pre- dictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mech- anism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar impli- cations. This paper provides tight necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation with bounded depth of reasoning, discussing the role and implications of different behavioral anchors. The central con- dition slightly strenghthens standard incentive constraints, and we term it strict-if-responsive Bayesian incentive compatibility (SIRBIC).

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Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2016-6.

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Date of creation: 2016
Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2016-6
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

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