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Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution

Author

Listed:
  • L. Lambertini
  • A. Tampieri

Abstract

We extend the analysis carried out by Valletti (2000) by considering an environmental externality in a vertically differentiated duopoly where firms compete la Cournot with fixed costs of quality improvement. We show that, if the weight of the external effect is high enough, the resulting minimum quality standard is indeed binding.

Suggested Citation

  • L. Lambertini & A. Tampieri, 2011. "Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution," Working Papers wp749, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  • Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp749
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Amir, Rabah & Gama, Adriana & Maret, Isabelle, 2019. "Environmental quality and monopoly pricing," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    3. Rabah Amir & Adriana Gama & Katarzyna Werner, 2018. "On Environmental Regulation of Oligopoly Markets: Emission versus Performance Standards," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 70(1), pages 147-167, May.
    4. Luca Lambertini & Giuseppe Pignataro & Alessandro Tampieri, 2014. "Green Consumers, Greenwashing and the Misperception of Environmental Quality," DEM Discussion Paper Series 14-21, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    5. Cesaltina Pacheco Pires & Sílvia Ferreira Jorge & Margarida Catalão‐Lopes & Joana Pinho & Pedro Garcês & Adriana Alventosa, 2024. "Market configurations when marginal costs are quality‐dependent," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 45(6), pages 3972-3992, September.
    6. L. Lambertini & A. Tampieri, 2012. "On the Emergence of Overcompliance with Endogenous Environmental Standards and Patronising Consumers," Working Papers wp847, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    7. Dong, Quan & Chang, Yang-Ming, 2020. "Emission taxes vs. environmental standards under partial ownership arrangements," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 250-262.
    8. Lambertini, Luca & Pignataro, Giuseppe & Tampieri, Alessandro, 2020. "The effects of environmental quality misperception on investments and regulation," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 225(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General

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