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Judicial Independence and the Validity of Controverted Elections

Author

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  • Raphaël Franck

    (Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University)

Abstract

This article examines whether the judges of the French Constitutional Court demonstrated partisanship when ruling on the validity of the elections to the lower house of the French Parliament between 1958 and 2005. It uses a new dataset on the decisions of the Constitutional Court which takes into account the characteristics of the controverted parliamentary elections. The rulings of the Constitutional Court are found to be biased against far-right candidates. However, the judges are also found to display some form of independence vis-à-vis the government since they do not favor candidates from the ruling party when they render their decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Raphaël Franck, 2009. "Judicial Independence and the Validity of Controverted Elections," Working Papers 2009-8, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2009-8
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    File URL: https://www2.biu.ac.il/soc/ec/wp/2009-08.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Amaral-Garcia Sofia & Garoupa Nuno, 2017. "Judicial Behavior and Devolution at the Privy Council," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 1-40, November.
    2. Raphaël Franck, 2018. "Judicial impartiality in politically charged cases," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 193-229, June.
    3. Espinosa Romain, 2017. "Constitutional Judicial Behavior: Exploring the Determinants of the Decisions of the French Constitutional Council," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 1-41, July.
    4. Garoupa, Nuno & Grembi, Veronica, 2015. "Judicial review and political partisanship: Moving from consensual to majoritarian democracy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 32-45.
    5. Nuno Garoupa & Marian Gili & Fernando Gómez‐Pomar, 2012. "Political Influence and Career Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Administrative Review by the Spanish Supreme Court," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(4), pages 795-826, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Judicial independence; Judicial politics; Judges; Parliamentary elections;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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