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Judicial Independence and the Validity of Controverted Elections

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  • Raphaël Franck

Abstract

This article examines whether the judges of the French Constitutional Court demonstrated partisanship when ruling on the validity of the elections to the lower house of the French Parliament between 1958 and 2005. It uses a new dataset on the decisions of the Constitutional Court which takes into account the characteristics of the controverted parliamentary elections. The rulings of the Constitutional Court are found to be biased against far-right candidates. However, the judges are also found to display some form of independence vis-à-vis the government since they do not favor candidates from the ruling party when they render their decisions. Copyright 2010, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Raphaël Franck, 2010. "Judicial Independence and the Validity of Controverted Elections," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 394-422.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:12:y:2010:i:2:p:394-422
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/aler/ahq011
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:kap:copoec:v:29:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10602-017-9252-z is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Jarosław Kantorowicz & Nuno Garoupa, 2016. "An empirical analysis of constitutional review voting in the polish constitutional tribunal, 2003–2014," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 66-92, March.
    3. Garoupa, Nuno & Grembi, Veronica, 2015. "Judicial review and political partisanship: Moving from consensual to majoritarian democracy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 32-45.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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