Security Strategies and Equilibria in Multiobjective Matrix Games
Multiobjective matrix games have been traditionally analyzed from two different points of view: equiibrium concepts and security strategies. This paper is based upon the idea that both players try to reach equilibrium points playing pairs of security strategies, as it happens in scalar matrix games. We show conditions guaranteeing the existence of equilibria in security strategies, named security equilibria
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- Borm, P.E.M. & Tijs, S.H. & van den Aarssen, J.C.M., 1988. "Pareto equilibria in multiobjective games," Other publications TiSEM a02573c0-8c7e-409d-bc75-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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