Vertical and Horizontal Reciprocity in a Theory of Taxpayer Compliance
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- Bazart, C. & Bonein, A., 2014.
"Reciprocal relationships in tax compliance decisions,"
Journal of Economic Psychology,
Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 83-102.
- Cécile Bazart & Aurélie Bonein, 2012. "Reciprocal Relationships in Tax Compliance Decisions," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201239, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Cécile Bazart & Aurélie Bonein, 2014. "Reciprocal relationships in tax compliance decisions," Post-Print halshs-00867505, HAL.
- Cécile Bazart & Aurélie Bonein, 2012. "Reciprocal Relationships in Tax Compliance Decisions," Working Papers 12-35, LAMETA, Universitiy of Montpellier, revised Dec 2012.
- Jaanika Merikull & Tairi Room & Karsten Staehr, 2013. "Perceptions of unreported economic activities in Baltic Firms. Individualistic and non-individualistic motives," Bank of Estonia Working Papers wp2012-8, Bank of Estonia, revised 04 Feb 2013.
- William F. Fox & Matthew N. Murray, 2014.
"Taxing the small: Fostering tax compliance among small enterprises in developing countries,"
Chapters,in: Taxation and Development: The Weakest Link?, chapter 6, pages 170-192
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- William F. Fox & Matthew Murray, 2013. "Taxing the Small: Fostering Tax Compliance Among Small Enterprises in Developing Countries," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1310, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- R.Kavita Rao & Suranjali Tandon, 2016. "Revisiting the Tax Compliance Problem using Prospect Theory," Working Papers id:11225, eSocialSciences.
- Torgler, Benno, 2011. "Tax morale and compliance : review of evidence and case studies for Europe," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5922, The World Bank.
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Keywordstax compliance; tax morale; tax evasion; reciprocity;
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