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On the Cardinality of the Smith Set Under Impartial Culture with Many Alternatives

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  • Zachary Berchenko
  • Kaizhao Liu

Abstract

For some integer $\ell\geq 2$, consider $m=2\ell-1$ voters, each of which has a preference ranking over $n$ alternatives. The Smith set is the smallest nonempty set of alternatives each of which defeats every alternative outside the set in a pairwise majority comparison. Under the standard benchmark impartial culture where each voter uniformly and independently chooses a random preference ranking over all alternatives, we study the asymptotic probability that the Smith set has cardinality $s$ for fixed $\ell$ and $n\to \infty$. First, we prove that the probability that the Smith set has constant cardinality $s$ goes to zero at a rate of $\Theta_{\ell,s} (n^{-s(\ell-1)/\ell})$. Next, if $\min\{s,n-s\}\to\infty$, we show that this probability decays superpolynomially. Further, when $s$ and $n-s$ are both $\Theta(n)$, we prove that the probability decays exponentially and determine the exact exponential base. Finally, we prove that the probability that the Smith set contains all alternatives approaches one at a rate of $\Theta_\ell(n^{-(\ell-1)/\ell})$. These theorems resolve the conjectures in [Liu et al, Ann Stat 2026] under impartial culture.

Suggested Citation

  • Zachary Berchenko & Kaizhao Liu, 2026. "On the Cardinality of the Smith Set Under Impartial Culture with Many Alternatives," Papers 2610.03814, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2610.03814
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Bell, Colin E, 1981. "A Random Voting Graph Almost Surely Has a Hamiltonian Cycle When the Number of Alternatives Is Large," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1597-1603, November.
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