On the Cardinality of the Smith Set Under Impartial Culture with Many Alternatives
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- Lisa Sauermann, 2022. "On the probability of a Condorcet winner among a large number of alternatives," Papers 2203.13713, arXiv.org.
- William V. Gehrlein, 2006. "Condorcet’s Paradox," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-540-33799-7, April.
- Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
- Ilia Tsetlin & Michel Regenwetter & Bernard Grofman, 2003. "The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(3), pages 387-398, December.
- Bell, Colin E, 1981. "A Random Voting Graph Almost Surely Has a Hamiltonian Cycle When the Number of Alternatives Is Large," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1597-1603, November.
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