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Bins

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  • Mark Whitmeyer

Abstract

For an exogenous source of information and a prespecified number of messages k, I characterize the set of maximal--that is to say, undominated--summaries of the information that use at most k messages. When the exogenous information produces a regular distribution over posteriors (if it has a density on its affine hull, for instance), the maximal summaries take a precise geometric form. They are hierarchical power diagrams: convex subdivisions of the space of beliefs constructed by recursively subdividing cells according to weighted proximity criteria.

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  • Mark Whitmeyer, 2026. "Bins," Papers 2609.27888, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2609.27888
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lones Smith & Peter Norman Sørensen & Jianrong Tian, 2021. "Informational Herding, Optimal Experimentation, and Contrarianism," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(5), pages 2527-2554.
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    3. Mohlin, Erik, 2014. "Optimal categorization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 356-381.
    4. Frongillo, Rafael M. & Kash, Ian A., 2021. "General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 636-662.
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