IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2609.26223.html

Wherefore BIC = DIC?

Author

Listed:
  • Mark Whitmeyer

Abstract

I show that the equivalence in finite social-choice environments of Bayesian incentive compatibility and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility holds universally if and only if every type-dependent difference in the valuation of prizes operates through a single scalar type index. Beyond binary domains this universal robustifiability is nongeneric.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Whitmeyer, 2026. "Wherefore BIC = DIC?," Papers 2609.26223, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2609.26223
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2609.26223
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alex Gershkov & Jacob K. Goeree & Alexey Kushnir & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 197-220, January.
    2. Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(4), pages 1557-1593, July.
    3. Alexey Kushnir, 2013. "On the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation: the case of correlated types," ECON - Working Papers 129, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    4. Manelli, Alejandro M. & Vincent, Daniel R., 2019. "Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 214-226.
    5. Navin Kartik & SangMok Lee & Daniel Rappoport, 2024. "Single-Crossing Differences in Convex Environments," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(5), pages 2981-3012.
    6. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Mechanism Design," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 2, pages 49-96, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1992. "Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 378-399, April.
    8. Kushnir, Alexey, 2015. "On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 4-6.
    9. Ali E. Abbas & David E. Bell, 2011. "One-Switch Independence for Multiattribute Utility Functions," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(3), pages 764-771, June.
    10. Gabriel Carroll, 2012. "When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(2), pages 661-686, March.
    11. Alexey Kushnir & Shuo Liu, 2019. "On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(3), pages 617-644, April.
    12. Yi‐Chun Chen & Wei He & Jiangtao Li & Yeneng Sun, 2019. "Equivalence of Stochastic and Deterministic Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(4), pages 1367-1390, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. James Peck & Jeevant Rampal, 2021. "Optimal Monopoly Mechanisms with Demand Uncertainty," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 46(4), pages 1413-1429, November.
    2. Alexey Kushnir & Shuo Liu, 2019. "On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(3), pages 617-644, April.
    3. Frank Yang & Kai Hao Yang, 2025. "Multidimensional Monotonicity and Economic Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2428, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Frank Yang & Kai Hao Yang, 2025. "Multidimensional Monotonicity and Economic Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2428R1, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Yutong Zhang & Yangfan Zhou, 2026. "Knowledge-Based Mechanisms," Papers 2609.03439, arXiv.org.
    6. Frank Yang & Kai Hao Yang, 2025. "Multidimensional Monotonicity and Economic Applications," Papers 2502.18876, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2025.
    7. Tilman Börgers, 2017. "(No) Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(2), pages 73-82, June.
    8. Goeree, Jacob K. & Kushnir, Alexey, 2016. "Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 250-256.
    9. Anton Kolotilin & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2025. "Persuasion Meets Delegation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 93(1), pages 195-228, January.
    10. Paul H. Edelman & John A. Weymark, 2021. "Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(4), pages 1091-1120, November.
    11. Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage," Discussion Papers 17-03, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    12. Arigapudi, Srinivas, 2018. "On the equivalence of Bayesian and deterministic dominant strategy implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 37-40.
    13. Kristóf Madarász & Andrea Prat, 2017. "Sellers with Misspecified Models," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 790-815.
    14. Pasha Andreyanov & Ilia Krasikov & Alex Suzdaltsev, 2026. "Reduced Forms: Feasibility, Extremality, Optimality," Papers 2602.17812, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2026.
    15. Alexey Kushnir & Shuo Liu, 2015. "On the equivalence of bayesian and dominant strategy implementation: the case of non-linear utilities," ECON - Working Papers 212, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    16. Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack, 2026. "Extreme Points and Majorization," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2025_749, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    17. Mishra, Debasis, 2016. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 925-954.
    18. Shao, Ran & Zhou, Lin, 2016. "Optimal allocation of an indivisible good," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 95-112.
    19. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1463-1500, July.
    20. Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2017. "Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 35-63.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2609.26223. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.