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Learning to Agree under Pseudo-Reciprocity

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  • Shinya Sugiura

Abstract

We characterize the communication networks that ensure consensus in rational social learning under the sure-thing principle. A network ensures consensus if and only if it is pseudo-reciprocal, a property under which reciprocity may fail between individuals but holds at a coarser group level. Prior work has assumed message exchange to be bidirectional, yet such pairwise reciprocity proves largely dispensable. We show that a single bidirectional link can suffice, however large the population.

Suggested Citation

  • Shinya Sugiura, 2026. "Learning to Agree under Pseudo-Reciprocity," Papers 2608.22234, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2608.22234
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    References listed on IDEAS

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