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A Costly-information Foundation for Psychometric Curves

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  • Jake Zhang

Abstract

We study a binary choice problem in which an agent chooses between two actions whose payoff depends on a continuous state. The agent chooses how much effort to invest in learning about the state. Equivalently, we can think of the state as the strength of a stimulus, with the agent exerting costly effort to be more responsive to it. Taking as given the Fisher information cost introduced by Hebert and Woodford (2021), we analyze the optimal state-dependent choice rule using a variational approach. The main result is that agents' optimal response is an S-shaped function of the state under mild conditions. This prediction is aligned with the widely documented psychometric curve response profile observed in the experimental literature in psychology and economics.

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  • Jake Zhang, 2026. "A Costly-information Foundation for Psychometric Curves," Papers 2608.05444, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2608.05444
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Luciano Pomatto & Philipp Strack & Omer Tamuz, 2018. "The Cost of Information: The Case of Constant Marginal Costs," Papers 1812.04211, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2023.
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