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Two-Instrument Screening under Soft Budget Constraints

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  • Xinli Guo

Abstract

We study soft budget constraints in multi-tier public finance when an upper-tier government uses two instruments: an ex-ante grant schedule and an ex-post rescue. Under convex rescue costs and standard primitives, the three-stage leader-follower problem collapses to one dimensional screening with a single allocation index: the cap on realized rescue. A hazard-based characterization delivers a unified rule that nests (i) no rescue, (ii) a threshold-cap with commitment, and (iii) a threshold--linear--cap without commitment. The knife-edge for eliminating bailouts compares the marginal cost at the origin to the supremum of a virtual weight, and the comparative statics show how greater curvature tightens caps while discretion shifts transfers toward front loading by lowering the effective grant weight. The framework provides a portable benchmark for mechanism design and yields testable implications for policy and empirical work on intergovernmental finance.

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  • Xinli Guo, 2025. "Two-Instrument Screening under Soft Budget Constraints," Papers 2508.10724, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2508.10724
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