Managing Procurement Auction Failure: Bid Requirements or Reserve Prices
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References listed on IDEAS
- Fang, Hanming & Tang, Xun, 2014.
"Inference of bidders’ risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry,"
Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 180(2), pages 198-216.
- Hanming Fang & Xun Tang, 2013. "Inference of Bidders' Risk Attitudes in Ascending Auctions with Endogenous Entry," NBER Working Papers 19435, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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