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Designing Digital Voting Systems for Citizens: Achieving Fairness and Legitimacy in Participatory Budgeting

Author

Listed:
  • Joshua C. Yang
  • Carina I. Hausladen
  • Dominik Peters
  • Evangelos Pournaras
  • Regula Hanggli Fricker
  • Dirk Helbing

Abstract

Participatory Budgeting (PB) has evolved into a key democratic instrument for resource allocation in cities. Enabled by digital platforms, cities now have the opportunity to let citizens directly propose and vote on urban projects, using different voting input and aggregation rules. However, the choices cities make in terms of the rules of their PB have often not been informed by academic studies on voter behaviour and preferences. Therefore, this work presents the results of behavioural experiments where participants were asked to vote in a fictional PB setting. We identified approaches to designing PB voting that minimise cognitive load and enhance the perceived fairness and legitimacy of the digital process from the citizens' perspective. In our study, participants preferred voting input formats that are more expressive (like rankings and distributing points) over simpler formats (like approval voting). Participants also indicated a desire for the budget to be fairly distributed across city districts and project categories. Participants found the Method of Equal Shares voting rule to be fairer than the conventional Greedy voting rule. These findings offer actionable insights for digital governance, contributing to the development of fairer and more transparent digital systems and collective decision-making processes for citizens.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua C. Yang & Carina I. Hausladen & Dominik Peters & Evangelos Pournaras & Regula Hanggli Fricker & Dirk Helbing, 2023. "Designing Digital Voting Systems for Citizens: Achieving Fairness and Legitimacy in Participatory Budgeting," Papers 2310.03501, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2310.03501
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Corazzini, Luca & Cotton, Christopher & Valbonesi, Paola, 2015. "Donor coordination in project funding: Evidence from a threshold public goods experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 16-29.
    3. Vivien Schmidt, 2010. "Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited - Input, Output and Throughput," KFG Working Papers p0021, Free University Berlin.
    4. Scharpf, Fritz W., 1998. "Interdependence and democratic legitimation," MPIfG Working Paper 98/2, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joshua C. Yang & Damian Dailisan & Marcin Korecki & Carina I. Hausladen & Dirk Helbing, 2024. "LLM Voting: Human Choices and AI Collective Decision Making," Papers 2402.01766, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
    2. Joshua C. Yang & Fynn Bachmann, 2025. "Bridging Voting and Deliberation with Algorithms: Field Insights from vTaiwan and Kultur Komitee," Papers 2502.05017, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2025.
    3. Yurun Ge & Lucas Bottcher & Tom Chou & Maria R. D'Orsogna, 2025. "Efficient Portfolio Selection through Preference Aggregation with Quicksort and the Bradley--Terry Model," Papers 2504.16093, arXiv.org.

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