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Anabolic Persuasion

Author

Listed:
  • Kfir Eliaz
  • Ran Spiegler

Abstract

We present a model of optimal training of a rational, sluggish agent. A trainer commits to a discrete-time, finite-state Markov process that governs the evolution of training intensity. Subsequently, the agent monitors the state and adjusts his capacity at every period. Adjustments are incremental: the agent's capacity can only change by one unit at a time. The trainer's objective is to maximize the agent's capacity - evaluated according to its lowest value under the invariant distribution - subject to an upper bound on average training intensity. We characterize the trainer's optimal policy, and show how stochastic, time-varying training intensity can dramatically increase the long-run capacity of a rational, sluggish agent. We relate our theoretical findings to "periodization" training techniques in exercise physiology.

Suggested Citation

  • Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2021. "Anabolic Persuasion," Papers 2105.08786, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2105.08786
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011. "Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
    2. Daron Acemoglu & Victor Chernozhukov & Ivàn Werning & Michael D. Whinston, 2020. "A Multi-Risk SIR Model with Optimally Targeted Lockdown," CeMMAP working papers CWP14/20, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
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