The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching Markets
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- Yash Kanoria, 2021. "Dynamic Spatial Matching," Papers 2105.07329, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2021-04-12 (Economic Design)
- NEP-URE-2021-04-12 (Urban and Real Estate Economics)
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