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Efficient allocation with ordinal preference intensities

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  • Georgios Gerasimou

Abstract

Standard ordinal allocation methods ignore how strongly agents value different improvements, while cardinal methods require additional assumptions that are often considered too demanding. This paper studies assignment problems in the middle ground environment of *ordinal preference intensities* where agents can rank alternatives as well as preference improvements. The two criteria it proposes--*intensity-efficient* and *intensity-positional* allocations--use this combined information to refine Pareto efficiency via a novel dominance concept and a generalization of Borda-style scoring, respectively.These criteria point in new directions where stronger welfare gains are possible without cardinal utility or monetary transfers assumptions.

Suggested Citation

  • Georgios Gerasimou, 2020. "Efficient allocation with ordinal preference intensities," Papers 2011.04306, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2026.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2011.04306
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marc Fleurbaey & Stéphane Zuber, 2021. "Fair Utilitarianism," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 370-401, May.
    2. Georgios Gerasimou, 2019. "Simple Preference Intensity Comparisons," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 201905, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews, revised 27 Apr 2020.
    3. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale & Jinwoo Kim, 2013. "Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(1), pages 73-107.
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