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Buchanan and the social contract: Coordination failures and the atrophy of property rights

Author

Listed:
  • Stefano Dughera

    (University of Piemonte Orientale)

  • Alain Marciano

    (University of Torino)

Abstract

James Buchanan advocated that societies should be based on a social contract. He rejected anarchy, seeing it as a “Hobbesian jungle” that calls for government intervention to maintain social order. He also opposed to theories of spontaneous order. These views led to debates about the compatibility of Buchanan’s works with classical liberalism, and even with democracy. This paper contributes to this discussion by exploring the development of Buchanan's views on anarchy from a historical viewpoint. We argue that Buchanan's earlier works contain a theory of spontaneous cooperation, and that Buchanan held to this theory until the 1970s. Then, the deteriorating conditions of American society got him convinced that albeit anarchy is theoretically desirable, cooperation requires individuals to enter a social contract and delegate enforcement authority to political institutions. Overall, the paper reconciles Buchanan's practical views with his philosophical inclinations, portraying him as a practical contractarian but a philosophical anarchist.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefano Dughera & Alain Marciano, 2024. "Buchanan and the social contract: Coordination failures and the atrophy of property rights," Working Papers AFED 24-03, Association Francaise d'Economie du Droit (AFED).
    • Handle: RePEc:afd:wpaper:2403
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • B53 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Austrian
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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