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The public choice of university organization. A stylized story of a constitutional reform

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  • Martin Paldam

    (Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Denmark)

Abstract

The essay presents and explains a highly stylized story of the reactions of the structure of a university to a constitutional reform – in the university law – that radically changed the power structure from a bottom-up representative system to a top-down hierarchical system practically without checks and balances. It was meant as a more business-like system to increasing effective-ness. However, the result has been precisely the reverse. Both the (relative) size and the salaries of the bureaucracy have increased, while its effectiveness has fallen. The bureaucracy has grown particularly fast in the special service bureaus outside the normal structure and in the PR-depart-ment. It is shown that these outcomes correspond to the predictions of public choice theory, notably of Niskanen’s theory of bureaucracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Paldam, 2014. "The public choice of university organization. A stylized story of a constitutional reform," Economics Working Papers 2014-08, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    • Handle: RePEc:aah:aarhec:2014-08
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Peter K. Hazlett & Chandler S. Reilly, 2023. "Bureaucratic rent creation: the case of price discrimination in the market for postsecondary education," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 226-256, June.
    3. Andersson, Fredrik W. & Jordahl, Henrik & Kärnä, Anders, 2021. "Ballooning Bureaucracy: Tracking the Growth of High-Skilled Administration within Swedish Higher Education," Working Paper Series 1399, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constitutional reform; bureaucratic growth;

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises

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