IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/isochp/978-1-4614-3600-3_11.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Inventory Centralization in a Newsvendor Setting When Shortage Costs Differ: Priorities and Costs Allocation

In: Handbook of Newsvendor Problems

Author

Listed:
  • Niv Ben-Zvi

    (Tel-Aviv University)

  • Yigal Gerchak

    (Tel-Aviv University)

Abstract

Risk pooling is a practical managerial tool which can reduce the consequences of the uncertainty involved in a system. In operations management, it is often achieved by consolidating a product with a random demands into one location, which is known to be beneficial. The basic assumption that underlies most previous research is that the cost parameters (overage and underage cost per unit) of all populations are identical, and therefore are equal to those of the centralized system. But in many contexts, underage cost per unit is not independent of the type of customer. This work generalizes the centralized inventory model so that one group of retailers differs from another in the underage cost per unit. In such a system, the proper allocation of the centralized inventory among the groups is a challenge. When the inventory is not allocated optimally, the expected cost of the centralized system may exceed that of the decentralized one. We define a priority rule for allocating the pooled inventory and prove that giving absolute priority to the population whose underage cost is higher (“preferred population”) is optimal. Under this policy, we model the pooled inventory system with priorities and prove its advantage over the un-pooled system. We then prove the advantage of the pooled inventory system with absolute priority from each retailer’s point of view, meaning that the core of the cooperative inventory game is not empty. Thus, with appropriate cost allocation, it is better to join the pool even if you were to become a low-priority customer. Finally, we introduce a pooled inventory model where the inventory is allocated according to each retailer contribution to the system, which is defined as the number of units it produces and deposits in the central warehouse. We use game theory concepts to model this system where each player’s strategy is the number of units it contributes to the system. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and characterize each player’s strategy according to it.

Suggested Citation

  • Niv Ben-Zvi & Yigal Gerchak, 2012. "Inventory Centralization in a Newsvendor Setting When Shortage Costs Differ: Priorities and Costs Allocation," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Tsan-Ming Choi (ed.), Handbook of Newsvendor Problems, edition 127, chapter 0, pages 263-276, Springer.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:isochp:978-1-4614-3600-3_11
    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-3600-3_11
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fisher Ke, Jian-yu & Otto, James & Han, Chaodong, 2022. "Customer-Country diversification and inventory efficiency: Comparative evidence from the manufacturing sector during the pre-pandemic and the COVID-19 pandemic periods," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 292-303.
    2. Çömez-Dolgan, Nagihan & Tanyeri, Başak, 2015. "Inventory performance with pooling: Evidence from mergers and acquisitions," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 331-339.
    3. Silbermayr, Lena, 2020. "A review of non-cooperative newsvendor games with horizontal inventory interactions," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    4. Silbermayr, Lena & Gerchak, Yigal, 2019. "Partial pooling by independent firms with allocation according to contribution to pool," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 218(C), pages 375-385.
    5. Silbermayr, Lena & Jammernegg, Werner & Kischka, Peter, 2017. "Inventory pooling with environmental constraints using copulas," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 263(2), pages 479-492.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:isochp:978-1-4614-3600-3_11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.